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Abstract. Confidentiality of patient data in the field of medical informatics is an 
important task. Leaked sensitive information within this data can be adverse to and 
being abused against a patient. Therefore, when working with medical data, 
appropriate and secure models which serve as guidelines for different applications 
are needed. Consequently, this work presents a model for performing a privacy 
preserving record linkage between study and registry data. The model takes into 
account seven requirements related to data privacy. Furthermore, this model is 
exemplified with a study on family based colorectal cancer in Germany. The 
model is very strict and excludes possible violations towards data privacy 
protection to a reasonable degree. It should be applicable to similar use cases 
which are in need of a mapping between medical data of a study and a registry 
database. 
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Introduction 
Handling personal data is not only a matter of trust. In the worst case, leaked 
information can be adverse to and abused against an individual and cause severe 
damage. Therefore, in different fields of application, it is important to supply methods 
and models that provide a strong security environment. Especially when working with 
medical data, in particular, patient data, which often contain sensitive information, a 
high standard concerning obligation of secrecy needs to be maintained. One field of 
application in this domain is the task of medical record linkage where medical data of 
different datasets has to be mapped to each other. This is not a trivial task especially if 
patients’ anonymity has to be assured at any stage of the process. In this case, the 
record linkage is called privacy preserving [1]. 
In 2013, in Germany, an ongoing study concerning family based colorectal cancer 
(CRC) has to face this task [2]. There are multiple risk factors contributing to the 
development of CRC like smoking, lack of exercise, wrong eating habits and 
predominantly high age [3]. Aside from known genetic dispositions [4] there has been 
the observation of accumulations of cases of CRC within families. This means, having 
a family member with CRC is a risk factor in itself and is referred to as family based 
CRC [5].  
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 Genealogical links are not documented in cancer registries and are not available 
within the Munich Cancer Registry (MCR) itself (cf. www.tumorregister-muenchen.de). 
Therefore, the study design aims at gathering family information from newly diagnosed 
patients who accept to participate in the study. Information needed are identifying data, 
in specific, first name, last name, date of birth, address and gender of all close relatives 
of the patient. This data is matched to the MCR by using a probabilistic record linkage 
approach in order to identify study patients and relatives within the cancer registry who 
have been diagnosed with CRC or associated kinds of cancer in the past. Their medical 
data as well as their genealogical information has then to be passed to the analysis 
center for further research. Information about family members not registered in the 
MCR contributes to the study’s finding as well. 
The study design demands a highly complex safety infrastructure including 
multiple parties in order to fulfill the obligations based on the strict laws of privacy 
protection in Germany. In this work’s section of methods we give a detailed overview 
about these obligations and requirements and a description of the model itself. In the 
section of results we present how we fitted the model to the study of family based CRC.  
 
1. Methods 
As postulated in guidelines regarding data privacy protection in a medical environment 
[6] one of the requirements for a model of data protection is the conceptual and 
institutional division of all participating parties. In case of performing a data matching, 
this should result in four different parties as illustrated in figure 1. These are typically 
the two institutions managing the study as well as the registry datasets which are 
supposed to be mapped together, the location of an independent data trustee whose 
main task is to perform the matching process as well as the center which will perform 
the final analysis. The standard procedure used for matching data is referred to as 
record linkage [7]. 
In the case of patient data, attributes like first name, last name or date of birth 
within the identifying data (IDAT) are used to match the patients within the different 
datasets. However, the IDAT should not be readable for any other participating 
institution. Consequently, a variant of a standard probabilistic record linkage, so called, 
anonymous or privacy preserving record linkage is needed that operates on one way 
encrypted attributes instead of attributes written in plain text. One way encryption can 
be achieved by applying hash functions to a string of text [8] or alternatively 
representing the string as a bloom filter filled with different hash values [1]. This task 
has to be performed by the data trustee. Before sent to the data trustee, the IDAT are 
marked with an institution specific ID which is a unique identifier as well as a 
reference to the corresponding medical data (MDAT) labelled with the same ID.  
To expand the model, the third stipulation would be that MDAT should in general, 
aside from its originating institution, only be readable by the center of analysis. As 
discussed later, at the location of the data trustee a conversion of the study ID within 
the IDAT and consequently also within the study MDAT is required. Thus, the study’s 
MDAT are sent to the data trustee as well. Due to the fact that it should not be readable 
by any other institution but the center of analysis the contents of the study MDAT have 
to be symmetrically encrypted before. Following, the result of the record linkage 
process is a list of pairs of IDs, referred to as links [9], describing which patients of the 
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different datasets relate to the same entity. The objective of these links is to request the 
MDAT of the registry according to the registry’s ID within the links.  
 
Figure 1. (1) IDAT and MDAT of the study database as well as IDAT of the registry database are sent to the 
data trustee. (2) After replacing the ID within IDAT and MDAT of the study database with a new random ID, 
the MDAT of the study database is redirected to the center of analysis. (3) After the record linkage process, 
the links (pairs of IDs) are sent to the registry database. (4) The requested MDAT of the registry are sent to 
the center of analysis. Based on the new random ID, the MDAT of the study as well as the registry database 
can be mapped to each other. 
 
In order to prevent a possible identification based on the information within the 
MDAT, another requirement should be the realization of k-anonymity on the quasi 
identifiers within this data [10]. 
As a fifth request, the model demands that study and registry IDs may only be 
known by the original institutions as well as the data trustee. Thus, the IDs have to be 
replaced by a new random ID through the data trustee. This new random ID is the only 
ID transferred to the center of analysis. 
Premise six requires that the new random ID may only be shared by the data 
trustee and the center responsible for analysis. Therefore this ID has to be 
symmetrically encrypted within the links before shared with the registry. According to 
the registry’s ID within the links, the registry can now extract the needed MDAT, map 
it to the encrypted new random ID, remove the registry’s ID and send the MDAT along 
with the encrypted new random ID to the center of analysis. In parallel, the center of 
analysis receives the encrypted MDAT of the study labeled with the same new random 
ID from the data trustee. At this point, both the MDAT of the registry as well as the 
study can be mapped together based on the new random ID. 
To offer an additional layer of security, all transported data handled between 
institutions should be asymmetrically encrypted throughout the whole process. All used 
methods should be considerably save and up to date according to national laws, in this 
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case according to the recommendations of the BSI which is the bureau for security in 
IT technology in Germany [11].  
2. Results  
Within the study of family based CRC an institutional as well as conceptual division is 
given for both the MCR as well as the study database. The role of the data trustee is 
performed by an independent person which is the data protection commissioner of the 
University Hospitals of the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU) while the center 
of analysis is represented by a statistical workgroup of the Institute of Medical 
Information Processing, Biometry and Epidemiology of the LMU. 
The used record linkage system is a probabilistic record linkage system based on 
the widely used algorithm of Felligi and Sunther [12] as well as on technical guidelines 
formulated by Martin Meyer [13]. The system has been implemented in java 1.7 and 
uses some custom technologies to better adapt to the scenario. Some of these 
customizations have been described in a previous publication [14]. Precedent to the 
record linkage, the IDAT of both the MCR as well as the study database are first 
standardized according to UNICON guidelines [15] and one way encrypted by using a 
hash function of the SHA-2 family [16]. 
The study’s MDAT consist of simple questions as well as the genealogical 
relations (family structure) of the patients and their relatives. To render this information 
unreadable when passed to the data trustee it is symmetrically encrypted by using the 
AES algorithm with a block length of 128bit [17].  The method has been implemented 
and adapted to the scenario in java by using the packages java.security.* as well as  
javax.crypto.*. The key to decrypt the MDAT is only shared by the study database and 
the center of analysis. K-anonymity for both the study and registry MDAT has not been 
done since there were no quasi-identifiers being strong enough to violate the concept of 
anonymity to a disconcerting degree. At the location of the data trustee and according 
to the model, a new random ID replaces the old ID within the study’s IDAT, MDAT 
and consequently within the generated links. To accommodate to the sixth requirement 
the ID within the links is symmetrically encrypted using the same technology as 
previously explained before sent to the MCR. Once again the key is only given to the 
center of analysis.  
For most transported data, a hybrid encryption system, which is a variant of 
asymmetrical encryption, has been implemented using the RSA/AES algorithm [18]. 
The used key length is 2048 bits. The technology has been adapted to the scenario and 
written in java.  
3. Discussion 
The presented model can be used as a template for studies which base their 
analysis on matching study data to data of medical registries. It is very strict in its 
requirements and therefore eliminates possible violations endangering the privacy of 
the patients’ data. A positive approval in regard of law and ethics by the LMU’s ethical 
review committee has been given in December 2012. 
Due to the strictness of the model, comprehensive logistic and organizational 
efforts are needed. Therefore this model should be best suited for studies of larger scale.  
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  As presented in the results section of this work, the requirements could be 
successfully applied to the study of family based CRC in Germany. One major task was 
maintaining the family structure throughout the whole process which could be achieved 
by modeling the family structure as medical data. Based on the family structure, the 
center of analysis is capable of rebuilding all genealogical relations between MDAT of 
patients and their relatives.  
Because of the replacement of IDs during the whole process, it is important to note 
that this model is not applicable to cumulative record linkage. This means if new 
patients are recruited, the record linkage has to be performed on the whole dataset and 
not only on the new fraction of patients. 
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